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JUDGING IN INTERESTING TIMES: THE FREE
SPEECH CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE
BYRON R. WHITE +
Bernard W. Bell-+
"May you live in interesting times."
-Alleged Chinese curse (source unknown)'
"It has been an interesting and exciting experience to serve on the
Court."
-Justice Byron R. White
2
Justice Byron R. White's Supreme Court career spanned a momentous
era for the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. When he assumed his
seat on the Court in 1962, Free Speech Clause cases typically involved
conflicts between the government and dissident or unconventional
speakers.3 Such speakers were considered susceptible to intimidation, and
This article was orginally delivered as remarks at the Catholic University Law Review
Symposium on November 18,2003. Portions of these remarks are also discussed in Bernard
W. Bell, The Populism of Justice Byron R. White: Media Cases and Beyond, 74 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1425 (2003).
- Professor and Herbert Hannoch Scholar, Rutgers Law School (Newark), and Visiting
Professor, Columbia Law School, 2003-04. Law Clerk to Justice Byron R. White, October
Term 1982.
1. This phrase, commonly described as a Chinese curse, is likely of recent Western
origin. The most likely source is Duncan H. Mauro's science-fiction story entitled "U-Turn"
published in the 1950s, although he may have borrowed the phrase from CARL G. JUNG, THE
SECRET OF THE GOLDEN FLOWER (1931). In any event, the phrase seems to have come to
popular attention when Robert F. Kennedy used it in a speech in Capetown, South Africa on
June 7,1966. See BBCi, h2g2, The Guide to Life, the Universe and Everything, Guide Entry,
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A798564 (last visited Oct. 5, 2003).
2. Ruth Marcus & Joan Biskupic, Justice White toRetfireAfter3l Years, WASH. POST,
Mar. 20, 1993, at Al (discussing Justice White's March 19, 1993 retirement announcement).
3. SeegenerallyNAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375
(1962); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S.
36 (1960); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395
(1953); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951);
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). A
review of the First Amendment references in BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL
WARREN AND His SUPREME COURT - A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY (1983), confirms the above-
noted quality of the cases involving the Free Speech Clause. For an argument that the First
Amendment should focus on protecting dissent, see STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND ROMANCE 90-91, 93, 152-53,161,167-69 (1990).
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Free Speech Clause jurisprudence reflected that assumption.4 During much
of Justice White's tenure, free speech cases regularly pitted the government
against powerful interests,5 or pitted speakers asserting their free speech
rights against individuals harmed by that speech who had enlisted the legal
process or the government to vindicate their interests.6
When Justice White assumed his seat on the Court, the traditional
categorical exclusions of certain speech from constitutional protection
remained in place Thus, for example, speech categorized as commercial orS8
defamatory received little protection. Justice White's tenure on the Court
saw an expansion of the Free Speech Clause's scope that brought allegedly
defamatory speech and commercial speech within its protection. The Court
imposed constitutional restraints on defamation actions, beginning with
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,9 and commercial speech restrictions,
beginning with Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
4. SeeThornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940). Cases decided in the first few
years of Justice White's career also reflected this concern. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland,
380 U.S. 51,59 (1965); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279 (1964); Button, 371 U.S.
at 433.
5. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369-70 (1969) (regarding the
constitutionality of "fairness doctrine" obligations imposed on broadcasters); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976) (addressing the constitutionality of campaign finance restrictions);
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (ruling on the
constitutionality of regulation limiting advertising intended to stimulate purchase of utility
services); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (concerning the
constitutionality of state requirement that a shopping mall allow citizens to disseminate
messages on mall property); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Deigo, 453 U.S. 490, 502 (1981)
(regarding the constitutionality of billboard regulations); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer
Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988) (ruling on the constitutionality of an ordinance licensing news
racks). See also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 630 (1994) (judging the
constitutionality of "must carry" requirements imposed upon cable television systems and
decided the term after Justice White left the bench).
6. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 50 1 U.S. 663 (1991); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S.
524 (1989); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
7. Just before Justice White left the bench, the Justices debated the analytical
framework of the categorical approach in R.A. V v. Cityof St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). The
case involved "fighting words," which are categorically excluded from Free Speech Clause
protection. Id. at 380. In his separate concurrence for himself and two other Justices, White
defended the traditional conception of the categorical approach, namely that such speech lay
entirely beyond Free Speech Clause protection. ld. at 397. The five-Justice majority asserted
that even with respect to such categorically unprotected speech, Government could not treat
fighting words differently based on the message the speaker wished to convey. Id. at 391-92.
In the words of Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority, "St. Paul has no ... authority to
license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of
Queensberry rules." Id. at 392. Justice Stevens advocated a third approach to addressing
statutes that selectively proscribed categorically unprotected speech. See id at 426-29.
8. See R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 382-85; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,571-72
(1942).
9. 376 U.S. 254, 264-71, 279-80 (1964).
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Consumer Council, Inc.' Those developments spawned an increasingly
complex doctrinal web and regularly demanded the Court's attention."
Justice White's career also encompassed the Supreme Court's sustained
re-examination of the press's role in the polity. The governmental excesses
of the late 1960s and early 1970s established a powerful case for recognizing
and protecting the press as a watchdog capable of uncovering government
wrongdoing. The press coverage of the Vietnam War, highlighted by the
New York Times' and Washington Posts publication of the Pentagon
Papers,"2 and the Washington Post-led investigations of the Watergate
scandal, which ultimately led to President Richard Nixon's resignation
under threat of impeachment, demonstrated the importance of a free
press. 3 Not surprisingly, important jurists and scholars began to conceive of
the press as an important structural component of the political system,
virtually characterizing the press as a quasi-governmental entity within the
constitutional scheme of checks and balances envisioned by the
Constitution's Framers.' 4 In effect, these scholars and jurists viewed the
press as a fourth branch of government.
By 1993, when Justice White's tenure ended, litigants contesting
journalists' invocation of the First Amendment were finding greater judicial
receptivity to their less benign view of the press; a view that portrayed the
media not as a weak institution constantly at risk for speaking unpalatable
truths about the powerful, but a powerful institution that transgressed the
bounds of common decency in an effort to entertain as much as inform.
10. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,770-
71 (1976). See also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,558-
72(1980).
11. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16.31,
16.33-.35 (5th ed. 1995).
12. See N.Y.Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (upholding the right of the
New York Times and the Washington Post to publish the contents of a classified government
study). The Pentagon Papers were Department of Defense documents regarding the Vietnam
War leaked to journalists by Daniel Ellsberg. See DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE
PRESSES STOPPED: A HISTORY OF THE PENTAGON PAPERS CASE 46-48 (1996).
13. See Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 631 (1975).
14. Id. at 634 ("The primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a free press was..
to create a fourth institution outside the Government as an additional check on the three
official branches."); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521,527-28.
15. Plaintiffs are more frequently suing traditional media entities for newsgathering torts
or law enforcement officials who allow traditional media access to information. See, e.g.,
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (seeking damages for dissemination of information a
journalist obtained from a third party who had violated federal wiretap laws); Wilson v. Layne,
526 U.S. 603 (1999) (seeking damages against law enforcement officials for permitting media
ride-along); Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000) (upholding arrestee's claim against
law enforcement official who put him through a "perp walk" for the benefit of the photo-
journalists); Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1.999) (seeking
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Justice White's tenure also spanned an era when the Court began to
recognize government as a speaker. Shortly after Justice White assumed
the bench, noted scholar Charles Reich highlighted the implications of the
government control over an increasingly greater share of this country's
resources. 6 The Court regularly struggled with cases involving government
control of speech in its capacity as a proprietor entitled to exercise
dominion over its own resources. 7 Indeed, the application of the First
Amendment to the manner in which government entities exercise dominion
over their own resources has increasingly occupied the Court in recent
years.' Justice White stood at the center of many of the Supreme Court's
efforts to grapple with the above controversies as well as others in which
citizens invoked the Free Speech Clause. Accordingly, the jurisprudence
reflected in Justice White's free speech opinions provides an important
subject for study, and serves as the focus of this paper.19
damages on various newsgathering tort claims arising out of a hidden camera investigation);
Sanders v. Am. Broad. Co., 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) (upholding a claim against a journalist for
unlawful wiretapping); Deteresa v. Am. Broad. Co., 121 F.3d 460 (9th Cir. 1997) (same);
Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997) (seeking damages from law enforcement
officials and journalists as a result of media ride-alongs).
Judicial discussions have exhibited a greater receptivity to this less charitable view of the
press, as jurists have remarked upon the convergence of news and entertainment. SeeDesnick
v. Am. Broad. Co., 44 F.3d 1345, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Today's 'tabloid' style investigative
television reportage, conducted by networks desperate for viewers in an increasingly
competitive television market, constitutes-although it is often shrill, one-sided, and offensive,
and sometimes defamatory-an important part of that market."); Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F.
Supp. 1413,1418 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("[T]he television market for scandal and sensationalism has
encouraged T.V. journalists to engage in forms of newsgathering that may bring about a clash
between the right to privacy and freedom of the press."). Commentators outside the courts
have discussed the convergence of news and entertainment more directly. See JAMES
FALLOWS, BREAKING THE NEWS: HOW THE MEDIA UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
92-93, 114-15, 128, 144 (1996); HAYNES JOHNSON, SLEEPWALKING THROUGH HISTORY:
AMERICA IN THE REAGAN YEARS 143-44 (1991); HOWARD KURTZ, MEDIA CIRCUS: THE
TROUBLE WITH AMERICA'S NEWSPAPERS 144-45,339-40 (1993); STEVEN D. STARK, GLUED
TO THE SET: THE 60 TELEVISION SHOWS AND EVENTS THAT MADE US WHO WE ARE
TODAY 188-194 (1997).
16. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 736 (1964).
17. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497
U.S. 62 (1990); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988); Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Bd. of Educ.,
Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); United States Postal
Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114 (1981); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980);
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, (1975);
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
18. See infra note 124.
19. 1 do not attempt a comprehensive examination of Justice White's Free Speech Clause
body of work. This article covers only a modest portion of that body of work.
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THE ROLE OF THE PRESS
Justice White refused to consider the press a "fourth branch" of
government, particularly if acknowledging such a status meant excusing the
press from obligations otherwise imposed upon the general public. Justice
White authored the Court's opinion in a series of cases in which press
advocates argued that governmental actors must, as a constitutional matter,
modify the application of generally-applicable obligations to the press,
given the nature of the press's role in the polity and the needs of journalists.
In Branzburg v. Hayes,2° journalists asserted a First Amendment right to
refuse to disclose to law enforcement officials either the identities of their
confidential sources or information obtained under promises of
confidentiality. The press argued that its ability to report on governmental
activities might be significantly compromised if journalists had to identify
confidential sources or divulge information gathered from those sources.21
Justice White, writing for a plurality of the Court, refused to accord
journalists any such special First Amendment privilege.22 Journalists, the
Court stated, should have no greater right than any other citizen to withhold
information sought by a grand jury."
Justice White's rejection of the concept of the media as a "fourth branch"
of government surfaces in his response to the press's attempt to analogize
its confidential sources to those of law enforcement. 24 Advocates argued
that the Court should equate the press with law enforcement officials, who
can shield the identities of their confidential informants from grand juries.
To Justice White, the crux of the divergent treatment of law enforcement
and the press lay in the respective differences in public control over each
institution. The public, he noted, exercises control over law enforcement
decisions to conceal informant identities, but lacks such control over similar
decisions by journalists. 26
Justice White refused to recognize a special privilege protecting the
institutional press for yet another reason. He believed that courts should
not attempt to distinguish the institutional press from all others who seek to
inform the public, be they "lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic
researchers, and dramatists," or even the "lonely pamphleteer who uses
20. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
21. Id. at 679-80.
22. Id. at 697.
23. Id. at 682-83.
24. Id. at 697-99.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 698-99. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger used a similar argument six years later
in explaining why the press had no First Amendment guaranteed right of access to
correctional institutions. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978).
2003]
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carbon paper or a mimeograph."27 White thus questioned the concept of
according the organized press a privileged position among those who
engaged in the dissemination of ideas.28
In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, Justice White again authored the Court's
opinion in a case that required the resoution of a conflict between law
enforcement and the press. In that case, journalists sought constitutional
immunity from law enforcement searches of newsrooms to find evidence of
criminal conduct documented byjournalists.0 Law enforcement authorities
had searched the Stanford Dailys offices seeking photographs taken by
staff photographers during a demonstration." The officials wished to
identify the perpetrators of violence during the demonstration by examining
the photographs.32 As counsel for the Stanford Daily and various amicus
curiae noted, allowing such searches would quite likely diminish journalists'
access to confidential information and disrupt news operations.33 Justice
White, writing for the majority, refused to accord the press special
protection. Although asserting that courts must apply the Fourth
Amendment with "scrupulous exactitude" when law enforcement officials
seek to search newsrooms, Justice White declared that journalists must
nevertheless shoulder the obligations borne by all other citizens.34 In
particular, journalists, like all citizens, must submit themselves to searches
upon showing of probable cause to believe that their premises held
evidence of criminal activity.35
In Herbert v. Lando," Justice White authored a majority opinion
regarding the scope of discovery in defamation cases. Journalists argued
that the Court should limit discovery requests seeking information about
the interactions of journalists and editors during the editorial process,
because liberal discovery rules threatened to chill the frank interchange of
37ideas and concerns that occur during the editorial process. One of the
judges on the Second Circuit panel that considered the case on its way to
the Supreme Court observed: "[T]he editorial relationship may be chilled if
27. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 703-05.
28. Chief Justice Burger would rely on a similar argument six years later in First Nat'I
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 435 U.S. 765,801-02 (1978). Ironically, in Bellotti4 White wrote a
strident dissent. Id. at 802.
29. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
30. Ad. at 533-34.
31. Id. at 551.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 563-64.
34. Id. at 564 (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476,485 (1965)).
35. Id. at 563-67.
36. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
37. Id. at 171.
[Vol. 52:893
Judging in Interesting Times
its dynamics are subject to forced scrutiny .... [A]s soon as [the process of
editorial selection] is subject to scrutiny, there is a suppression effect; and as
soon as there is such an effect, the freedom of the press has evaporated.,
38
Justice White had acknowledged the cogency of an analogous argument
with regard to Executive Branch officials in the Bivenscontext,39 concluding
that concerns about harming consultations among government officials
justified limiting Bivens liability and making dismissals of summary
judgment motions in Bivens actions immediately appealable. 4' And indeed,
in Herbert v. Lando, Justice White observed that a law, "subject[ing] the
editorial process to private or official examination merely to satisfy curiosity
or to serve some general end such as the public interest," would not survive
First Amendment scrutiny.4 Nevertheless, Justice White, writing for the
Court, declared that journalists sued for defamation must respond to
discovery requests as other citizens do.42
In Cohen v. Cowles Media,43 the Court addressed journalists' liability for
divulging information in violation of a promise of confidentiality. The St.
Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch and the Minneapolis Star and Tribune
obtained damaging information about the Democratic candidate for
Lieutenant Governor from Dan Cohen, a staffer with the opposing
candidate's campaign.4 Cohen had provided the information only after the
papers' reporters promised him confidentiality.45 Both editorial staffs
ultimately concluded that the source of the information constituted an
important element of the story.46 Accordingly, both papers not only
published the damaging information, but also identified Cohen as its source,
revealed his affiliation with the Republican candidate's campaign, and
included the campaign's denial of any role in divulging the information.47
38. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 994-95 (2d Cir. 1977).
39. The liability of federal officials for violations of individuals' constitutional rights is
referred to as Bivens liability, alluding to the first case in which such liability was recognized,
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of FederalBureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
40. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,524-30 (1985) (White, J.); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800,816-18 (1982) (Powell, J.) ("Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation therefore may
entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons, including an official's
professional colleagues. Inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective
government.").
41. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 174.
42. Id. at 175-77. He also noted that given the favorable substantive standard governing
defamation claims, allowing such discovery was the only practical way that defamation
plaintiffs could succeed in suing media entities. Id.
43. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
44. Id. at 665.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 666.
47. Id.
2003]
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The campaign immediately fired Cohen for disclosing the information, and
Cohen brought an action for promissory estoppel against the Press Dispatch
and the Tribune seeking damages for his discharge.48 Justice White again
wrote for a majority of the Court, upholding the claim against the
newspapers' First Amendment challenge, even though he acknowledged the
newsworthiness of Cohen's identity. 9  Despite the information's
newsworthiness, he explained, media entities must adhere to basic
obligations imposed upon all citizens, in this case the obligation to honor
promises upon which others rely. °
In short, Justice White authored several major opinions that established a
simple proposition-media entities' critical role in reporting government
excesses and their more general role in democratic governance do not, as a
matter of constitutional law, relieve them of the obligations borne by their
fellow citizens.
DEFAMATION
Justice White expressed strong and distinctive views regarding the
Court's defamation jurisprudence. He initially concurred with the Court's
decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,5 including the "fault"
requirements crafted by Justice Brennan." White surely found petitioners'
First Amendment claim compelling on the facts. The New York Timesand
various civil rights leaders challenged a defamation action brought by a
public official not named in the allegedly defamatory statement, who
claimed to have been defamed by comments regarding the manner in which
his subordinates performed their official duties in a highly-charged political
situation, and who could only cite trivial errors in the allegedly defamatory
document.53 It hardly takes an expansive view of the Free Speech Clause to
recognize such a defamation action as incompatible with the critical role
free speech plays in a democracy. Moreover, Justice White undoubtedly
was aware of the critical nature of press coverage in the battle for civil
rights, as well as the threat posed to such coverage by the Alabama state
court's judgment against the New York Times and civil rights leaders.54
After joining Justice Brennan's opinion resolving New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, however, Justice White spent the remainder of his career
48. Id.
49. Id. at 665-72.
50. Id. at 670-72.
51. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
52. Bernard W. Bell, Byron R. White, Kennedy Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1403
(1999).
53. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256-58.
54. Bell, supra note 52, at 1376-78, 1404-05 & n.214.
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attempting to cabin the defamation protections that grew out of that
landmark case. Though he uncharacteristically enjoyed little success in
persuading a majority of his colleagues, he wrote repeatedly and fervently
in defamation cases. 5 He argued that the fault requirement imposed by the
56Court unduly limited defamed citizens' ability to seek recompense . He
suggested protecting the media not by crafting fault requirements that
prevented all recovery, but by establishing damages principles that would
limit the potentially crushing liability faced by media entities.57 The Justice
also suggested that the Constitution should not preclude citizens from
seeking declaratory judgments of falsity unaccompanied by significant
damages awards.58 At other times, he suggested constitutionalizing the
common-law privilege of fair report, which would allow journalists to repeat
matters stated in official proceedings regardless of their belief as to the
truth of the matters asserted. 9 In yet other opinions, he suggested
constitutionalizing a type of "fair use" defense, which would allow media
entities to report on government activities.6°
55. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 525 (1991) (White, J.,
dissenting); Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 694 (1989)
(White, J., concurring); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,243 (1986) (White, J.);
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss, 472 U.S. 749, 765 (1985) (White, J., concurring); Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S 485,515 (1984) (White, J., dissenting); Herbert v. Lando,
441 U.S. 153,155 (1979) (White, J.); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,481 (1976) (White,
J., dissenting); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 369 (1974) (White, J., dissenting);
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 57 (1971) (White, J., concurring); Ocala Star-
Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 301 (1971) (White, J., concurring); Greenbelt Coop.
Publ'g Ass'n v. Bressler, 398 U.S. 6, 18 (1970) (White, J., concurring). He spoke about
defamation law even when other issues were at stake. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 263 (1974) (White, J., concurring) (stating that the Court's decision that day in
Gertz "[left] the people at the complete mercy of the press, at least in this stage of our history
when the press, as the majority in this case so well documents, is steadily becoming more
powerful and much less likely to be deterred by threats of libel suits"); Hustler Magazine, Inc.
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (White, J., concurring) ("As I see it, the decision in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan has little to do with this case, for here the jury found that the ad
contained no assertion of fact.").
56. E.g., Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 767-68.
57. Id. at 770-71.
58. E.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 393.
59. See, e.g., Greenbelt Coop., 398 U.S. at 23 ("If it is thought that the First Amendment
requires more protection for the media in this respect in accurately reporting events and
statements occurring at official meetings, it would be preferable directly to carve out a wider
privilege for such reporting.").
60. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 61-62 (White, J., concurring). Justice White stated:
I would accordingly hold that in defamation actions, absent actual malice as defined
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the First Amendment gives the press and the
broadcast media a privilege to report and comment upon the official actions of
public servants in full detail, with no requirement that the reputation or the privacy
of an individual involved in or affected by the official action be spared from public
view.
2003]
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Justice White's dissatisfaction with the Court's defamation jurisprudence
stemmed from his view of the press. He believed that the press was not
powerless, but powerful. For instance, in his separate opinion in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., White wrote:
The communications industry has increasingly become
concentrated in a few powerful hands operating very lucrative
businesses .... Neither the industry as a whole nor its individual
components are easily intimidated .... Requiring them to pay for
the occasional damage they do to private reputation will play no
substantial part in their future performance or their 6 1
Ultimately, Justice White seemed to have a relatively modest impact on the
development of the Court's defamation doctrines. However, he gave a
powerful voice to the adverse consequences of the Court's course and
sketched out several intriguing alternatives.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE
Scholars and jurists have increasingly recognized that various forms of
intellectual property threaten to undermine the "uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open debate, 62 that the Free Speech Clause seeks to foster.6 ' For
example, common-law rights of publicity increasingly clash with First
Amendment rights.6 The Supreme Court has rarely addressed the conflict
between intellectual property rights and free speech rights. However,
Justice White authored one of the two major cases addressing the issue
during his tenure on the Court, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Id. at 62.
61. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 390-91 (White, J., dissenting). See also Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at
767-74 (White, J., concurring); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 392, 399-400, 402-03; Miami Herald Publ'g
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,261-63 (1974) (White, J., concurring); Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at
60 (White, J., concurring). White's discussion of the increased concentration of the media and
the need for greater accountability echoed the concerns of some scholars. See LUCAS A.
POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN
AMERICA 289-91 (1991).
62. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (referring to the First
Amendment's "commitment [to] debate on public issues").
63. See generallyMichael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture
and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125 (1993); Alison P. Howard, A Fistful of Lawsuits:
The Press, the First Amendment, and Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 88 CAL. L. REV. 127
(2000); Terence J. Clark, Epilogue: When Privacy Rights Encounter First Amendment
Freedoms, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 921 (199 t).
64. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998). See also White v.
Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992); Carson v. Here's Johnny
Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 841-42 (6th Cir. 1983) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
65. However, the Court recently addressed the conflict in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186 (2003).
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Co.66 In Zacchini, a local television station filmed the act of Hugo Zacchini,
the "human cannonball," who shot himself out of a canon to delight carnival
crowds.67 During its news broadcast, the station showed a tape of Zacchini
being launched from the canon and landing in a net."' Zacchini sued the
television station, seeking damages for "unlawful appropriation of [his]
professional property., 6' The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that Zacchini
had stated a cause of action, though the members of the Court disagreed
over the nature of the intellectual property rights infringed, and concluded
that such a cause of action was consistent with the Free Speech Clause."'
Justice White's opinion for the Court was somewhat cryptic, as the
dissenting Justices themselves remarked.71 The Justices largely seemed to
agree on several aspects of the case: Zacchini's act was newsworthy, the
broadcast was part of a legitimate news program, and the broadcaster
apparently had not sought to commercially exploit the tape of Zacchini's
72performance. Moreover, Justice White acknowledged that future cases
might require the Court to distinguish between reporting the newsworthy
elements of an entertainment act and infringing upon a performer's
intellectual property rights.73 Justice White's opinion for the majority,
however, focused on two critical elements. First, he explained, the Free
Speech Clause does not prevent states from imposing damages upon
anyone, including journalists, who appropriated economically-valuable
assets without compensating the owner.74 Second, he viewed the challenged
66. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). The other case, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985), involved the boundaries of rights possessed under copyright
law, which have more explicit constitutional grounding than rights of publicity and related
intellectual property rights. As in Zacchini the majority rejected the Free Speech Clause
defense against liability for appropriating intellectual property rights. Id. at 542. However,
Justice White joined Justice Brennan's dissent arguing that the excerpting of a 300-word
passage from ex-President Gerald Ford's memoirs constituted "fair use," and therefore did not
infringe upon Ford's copyright. Id. at 579-80, 590-93.
67. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 563.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad., 351 N.E.2d 454, 461-62 (Ohio 1976).
71. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 579-80 (Powell, J., dissenting).
72. The dissent made these points explicitly. Id. at 580 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice
White, for the majority, did not dispute any of these three points, and explicitly conceded that
entertainment, such as that Zacchini provided, could be news. Id. at 578; accordid. at 569
(noting that Zacchini did not claim that his act was not newsworthy). Moreover, White
himself noted that the film was shown for fifteen seconds on the station's eleven o'clock news
program. Id. at 564.
73. Id. at 574-75. Indeed, later in Harper & Row, White joined the dissenters who
asserted that the publication of a passage from ex-President Gerald Ford's biography
explaining his pardon of Richard Nixon was protected by the "fair use" doctrine. Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 579 (1985).
74. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574-75.
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broadcast of Zacchini's "entire" performance as "go[ing] to the heart of
petitioner's ability to earn a living as an entertainer."" Thus he found
questions of newsworthiness, and cases offering some protection for media
entities when they published newsworthy matters, largely irrelevant.
In Zacchini, Justice White's tendency to hold the media to the same basic
obligations that apply to other citizens emerged once again. Ultimately,
though, White did not set out to construct a theory for resolving the tension
between intellectual property rights and free speech. Nevertheless,
Zacchiniremains a guidepost that courts must use to navigate when seeking
to accommodate free speech rights and intellectual property rights.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BROADCAST REGULATIONS
Justice White authored the Court's seminal opinion in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v FCC.7 6  In that case the Court endorsed a
conceptualiziation of broadcasters, as "public trustees," that differed
radically from the Court's traditional conceptualization of the print media.77
With respect to traditional media, the First Amendment guarantees the
owner of the medium control over its content. Thus, newspaper editors
control newspaper content. Such control places individuals attacked by the
newspapers at an unfair disadvantage because they cannot reach the same
audience to rebut the paper's assertion. Nevertheless, editorial control is
considered an essential component of the First Amendment protections
newspapers enjoy.7' As Justice White himself observed, in terms as
eloquent as those of any Free Speech Clause devotee:
We have learned, and continue to learn, from what we view as the
unhappy experiences of other nations where government has been
allowed to meddle in the internal editorial affairs of newspapers.
Regardless of how beneficent-sounding the purposes of
75. Id. at 576. Interestingly, in a case involving affirmative action in employment, White
showed even more clearly his concern for the threat to individual livelihoods. In Wygant v.
Board of Education, White wrote a cryptic concurrence expressing his support of the
majority's argument that the affirmative action program in the case was unconstitutional,
stating simply: "Whatever the legitimacy of hiring goals or quotas may be, the discharge of
white teachers to make room for blacks, none of whom has been shown to be a victim of any
racial discrimination, is quite a different matter." 476 U.S. 265, 294-95 (1986) (White, J.,
concurring). More informally, he said to a friend, "You just can't take an innocent man's job
away. You can't call that a remedy." DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS
WHIZZER WHITE: A PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 424 (1998).
76. 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969).
77. Id. at 383,399 n.26. The Court's traditional concept of print media is demonstrated in
MiamiHeraldPubl'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,262-63 (1974), where, without mentioning
Red Lion, the Court held that states could not require newspapers to print the replies of
political candidates to editorials attacking them.
78. See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 259. See also RedLion, 395 U.S. at 375, 386.
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controlling the press might be, we... remain intensely skeptical
about those measures that would allow government to insinuate
itself into the editorial rooms of this Nation's press."
In Red Lion, broadcasters challenged their classification by the
government as "public trustees" entitled to only limited First Amendment
protection. Before RedLion, the owners of two types of communications
media had long been distinguished from traditional speakers protected
under the Free Speech Clause. In particular, owners of telephone and
telegraph facilities were considered "common carriers," barred from
exercising control over the content of messages transmitted by their
facilities. 8°
In Red Lion, broadcasters challenged the fairness doctrine, which
required them to air balanced views on controversial matters of public
concern, on pain of losing their licenses."' The Court upheld the fairness
81doctrine, distinguishing broadcasters from traditional speakers. Justice
White, writing for the Court, presented two justifications for the Court's
ruling. The first focused upon the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, which
meant that mass communication by radio or television was not available to
everyone." Unlike newspaper owners, then, broadcasters were properly
considered trustees because they held their portion of the broadcast
spectrum for a limited period of time to present matters the public needed
to hear. Broadcasters' lawful dominion over a piece of the spectrum, the
Court stated, did not entitle them to "silence" others who wished to use the
spectrum.8
The second rationale Justice White offered would have relevance for
other cases as well, namely those involving government-facilitated speech.
He explained that the federal government itself had granted each broadcast
license owner a "monopoly" by giving each the exclusive right to use a
government-owned resource, namely a portion of the electromagnetic
79. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 259 (White, J., concurring).
80. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386-88, 395-98. Common carriers may own the facilities of
communication, but they do not control the content of the communications; rather they must
accept the communications of everyone who pays the required fee, regardless of content. See
Jerome A. Barron, The Telco, the Common Carrier Model and the First Amendment- The
"Dial-A -Porn "Precedent, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 371,382-85 (1993). In this
manner, communications common carriers are analogous to transportation common carriers,
such as railroads, airlines, and bus companies.
81. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386.
82. Id. at 386-88.
83. Id. at 387-88.
84. Id at 387.
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spectrum." Accordingly, Justice White continued, the government could
require each holder of a broadcast license to share its frequency.
6
Red Lion's critics have raised two questions: why does scarcity justify
jettisoning the market system customarily used to allocate scarce resources,
and why do governmental actors wield greater power to impose content
restrictions on broadcasters than on newspaper editors? With regard to the
scarcity rationale, critics have argued that ordinarily citizens and business
entities can acquire property rights in scarce resources, a "bundle of rights"
that includes the right to transfer ownership.8  Such a right to alienate
property allows markets to form and scarce resources to flow toward their
most productive use. Justice White did not directly address this argument,
but his answer might be surmised. On at least two occasions, Justice White
made it clear that government authorities could ensure that public resources
benefited everyone rather than some limited portion of the population. 8" A
property-based regime, particularly in conditions of severe scarcity, would
not ensure that the scarce resource benefited all segments of society.
Wealthy individuals could purchase broadcast frequencies to propagate
their own idiosyncratic views or for their own idiosyncratic purposes.89
85. Id. at 376-78, 396-401.
86. Id.
87. See Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast
Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 210-13, 242-47 (1982). Indeed, before the federal
government began to license the spectrum, at least one court tentatively had begun to craft a
property regime for the electromagnetic spectrum. See Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broad.
Station, Inc. (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill. 1926), reprinted in68 CONG. REC. 216 (1926). See
also Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First Amendment, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 905, 924-25 (1997); Pablo T. Spiller & Carlo Cardilli, Towards a Property
Rights Approach to Communications Spectrum, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 53, 56 (1999).
88. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 779 (1988)
(White, J., dissenting), where White stated:
From the outset of its contemporary public forum cases, this Court has recognized
that city streets and sidewalks 'have immemorially been held in trust for use of the
public' .... This means allof the public, and does not create a First Amendment
right in newspaper publishers to 'cordon' off a portion of the sidewalk in an effort to
increase the circulation of their papers.
Also, in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 568-70 (1975) (White, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). White asserted:
Whether or not a production as described by the District Court is obscene and may
be forbidden to adult audiences, it is apparent to me that the State of Tennessee
could constitutionally forbid exhibition of the musical to children, and that
Chattanooga may reserve its auditorium for productions suitable for exhibition to all
the citizens of the city, adults and children alike. 'Hair' does not qualify in this
respect, and without holding otherwise, it is improvident for the Court to mandate
the showing of 'Hair' in the Chattanooga auditorium.
Id.
89. In the early days of radio broadcasting, the Federal Radio Commission withdrew the
licenses of some licensees who were, in the Commission's view, using the license as a "personal
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Even profit-maximizing purchasers, who seek to attract the broadest
possible audience, might cater to those segments of the public possessing
the greatest purchasing power. Such a strategy may leave segments of the
population that command few resources without programming suited to
their tastesY9
Critics have also noted that just a few years after Red Lion, in Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,9' the Court overturned a Florida statute
that imposed "fairness" obligations on newspapers, requiring them to allow
a candidate attacked in an editorial to publish a reply in the newspaper.
Oddly, Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court failed to cite, much less
distinguish, RedLion.92 Critics view the cases as mystifyingly inconsistent at
best. Though Justice White did not write Tornillo, he concurred in the
Court's opinion and added a special concurrence, which rhapsodized
freedom of the press (and itself contained no reference to Red Lion).93
Justice White's jurisprudence suggests his answer to these critics' claims that
Red Lion and Tornillo conflict: Red Lion involved use of a government
resource while Tornillo did not. 94 The electromagnetic spectrum was a
public resource that the federal government had decided to license. In
doing so the government was free to impose modest obligations on the
licensees to act as public trustees, given the legitimate government concern
that scarcity prevented everyone from speaking. By contrast, local general
circulation newspapers, even though almost invariably enjoying a monopoly
position due to the economics of the newspaper business, do not
communicate by means of a public resource. Therefore, the government
cannot impose a "public trustee" obligation as the price for using a public
95
resource.
outlet" or a means to propagate a particular ideology, on the rationale that given the scarcity
of broadcast stations "there is no place for a station catering to any group[, and thus] [a]ll
stations should cater to the general public and serve public interest against group or class
interest." STUART MINOR BENJAMIN, DOUGLAS GARY LICHTMAN & HOWARD A.
SHELANSKI, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW & POLICY 20-23 (2001) (quoting the Federal
Radio Commission's 1929 Third Annual Report).
90. While reliance on a market-based approach was not constitutionally mandated,
regulators were free to decide that a market system best ensured a diversity of broadcast
voices that catered to a wide range of citizens. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S.
582, 603-04 (1981) (White, J.).
91. 418 U.S. 241, 258, 261-63 (1974).
92. See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., The Fairness Doctrine Today.
A Constitutional Curiosity and an Impossible Dream, 1985 DUKE L.J. 151, 156.
93. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 259-63.
94. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Public Utilities in the Marketplace of Ideas: A "Fairness"
Solution for a Competitive Imbalance, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 43, 52.
95. For example, the First Amendment did not entitle a newspaper to exercise exclusive
dominion over "public property," by maintaining news racks on public sidewalks, even though
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The FCC and the D.C. Circuit have progressively dismantled the fairness
doctrine.6 Both have concluded that any scarcity present when the
Supreme Court decided RedLion no longer exists. The FCC found that the
fairness doctrine actually led broadcasters to avoid controversy97
Moreover, both the D.C. Circuit and the FCC have been more vigorous in
applying the Free Speech Clause to broadcasting." Nevertheless, RedLion
remains the leading case regarding the constitutional status of
broadcasting.99
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION
In general, the Court has imposed significant First Amendment
restrictions upon federal and state attempts to regulate the financing of
political campaigns. The Court has consistently rejected the view that
legislatures can craft campaign finance restrictions to ensure that competing
candidates wield roughly equal financial resources"'9 The Court has held
that limiting the resources that some can devote to speech in an effort to
equalize the voice of competing speakers transgresses the First
Amendment. 1' The Court has permitted campaign finance regulation to
the newspaper's speech would thereby be facilitated. As Justice White explained in his dissent
in City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988):
[T]his Court has recognized that city streets and sidewalks "have immemorially been
held in trust for use of the public." This means allof the public, and does not create
a First Amendment right in newspaper publishers to "cordon" off a portion of the
sidewalk in an effort to increase the circulation of their papers.
Id. at 779 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
96. As the majority has noted, "courts and commentators have criticized the scarcity
rationale since its inception." Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 638 n.5 (1994).
97. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 661-62 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Fairness
Doctrine Report, 102 F.C.C. 2d 145, 146-48 (1985); In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace
Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043 (1987).
98. See, e.g., Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1130-40 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
99. The FCC's dismantling of the fairness doctrine was a part of a deregulatory initiative.
The movement toward deregulation took place later in the communications than in other
regulatory areas, such as the field of transportation. See generally STEPHEN BREYER,
REGULATIONS AND ITS REFORM (1982). White did not oppose deregulation, see FCC v.
WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981) (White, J.), but in a major administrative law
opinion, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29
42-43 (1983), he made it clear that lack of regulation was not to be viewed as the normative
baseline, such that rescinding regulations required no justification. Instead, White explained,
the status quo should be considered the normative baseline and thus deregulation as well as
regulation required justification and would be seriously reviewed under the Administrative
Procedure Act's "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Id.
100. For example, the Buckley v. Valeo majority summarily rejected the argument that the
First Amendment permitted Congress to create a level playing field by setting expenditure
limits on campaigns. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
101. Id.
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the extent that it ensures public disclosure of candidates' sources of
financial support. 1 2  The Court has also recognized that private
contributions to political candidates can lead to the appearance or reality of
corruption, i.e., explicit or tacit understandings between public officials and
their contributors that, if elected, they will use their powers to reward those
contributors. 3 Thus, the Court has upheld restrictions on contributions to
candidates.'O' However, it has struck down limitations on independent
expenditures advocating a candidate's election."5 Such independent
expenditures, the Court explained, cannot be considered a quidpro quo for
favorable treatment by a candidate if elected, because such funds, unlike
contributions, do not go to the candidate.'O The Court has also invalidated
contribution limits on committees supporting or opposing ballot initiatives
and referenda.' 7 Because such ballot propositions do not involve the
election of an officeholder who could favor contributors, they pose no risk
of actual or apparent corruption. Finally, the Court has consistently, since
Buckley v. Valeo, precluded legislatures from limiting campaign
expenditures, either by candidates or those who wish to speak
independently.'9
Justice White disagreed with virtually every limitation the Court placed
on campaign finance legislation. First, he objected to the proposition that
limiting the financing of speech limited "speech" itself; he believed that
funding speech, whether one's own or someone else's, was a form of
"conduct," and thus susceptible to more extensive regulation than pure
speech." This demonstrates Justice White's approach of carefully
distinguishing the speech and non-speech elements of communications."'
Thus, for White, limitations on contributions to political candidates and
restrictions on campaign expenditures, either in favor of political candidates
102. See id. at 66-67.
103. See id. at 26-27 ("It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary purpose-to
limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial
contributions-in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000
contribution limitation.").
104. See id.
105. Id. at 39-51; Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S. 480, 491,493-97 (1985).
106. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 497.
107. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 302 (1981).
108. Id. at 298-300.
109. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 493-98; First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-92 (1978); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-59.
110. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 262-64 (White, J., concurring); Nat'l Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 508-09 (White, J., dissenting).
111. See Bernard W. Bell, The Populism of Justice Byron R. White: Media Cases and
Beyond, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1425 (2003).
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or related to ballot propositions, were all governed by the analysis set forth
in United States v. O'Brien."2 Under the moderately deferential O'Brien
test, Justice White found virtually every campaign finance regulation
constitutional.
' 3
Second, he fundamentally disagreed with many of his brethren about the
legitimacy of the government interests served by campaign finance
regulation. For Justice White, preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption was not the only legitimate justification for regulating the
financing of political campaigns.' 4 Rather, he accepted the proposition that
legislatures may seek to equalize the resources available to both sides in
elections,"5 a proposition a majority of the Court emphatically rejected in
Buckley v. Valeo. Justice White also identified other legitimate
governmental interests furthered by various campaign finance regulations,
including "maintain[ing] public confidence in the integrity of federal
elections ... and hold[ing] the overall amount of money devoted to political
campaigning down to a reasonable level.""' 6 Ultimately, he feared unfair
dominance of the political processes by those who wielded economic
117power.
In addition, Justice White viewed the largely unregulated private
financing of campaigns as an impediment to communication between public
officials and the public they are elected to serve. In particular, he found
quite compelling the concerns of campaign finance reform's proponents
about the demands of fundraising upon elected officials' ability to devote
attention to the public business. He argued that reducing candidates' need
to raise funds would improve communication between candidates and the
public." Thus, in Buckley v. Valco, Justice White expressed confidence
that "limiting the total that can be spent will ease the candidate's
112. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
113. E.g., Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 502 (White, J.,
dissenting); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 303 (1981)
(White, J., dissenting); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802, 804 (1978)
(White, J., dissenting); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,257 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
114. Berkeley, 454 U.S. at 306-07 (White, J., dissenting).
115. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 266.
116. Nat'I Conservative PoliticalAction Comm., 470 U.S. at 509 (White, J., dissenting). In
Berkeley, White argued that the Court itself had long recognized that government had a valid
interest in "sustaining the active alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for
the wise conduct of government," that is, the state pursued "interests of the highest
importance." when it acted to "[p]reserv[e] the integrity of the electoral process [and] the
individual citizen's confidence in government." Berkeley, 454 U.S. at 306.
117. Berkeley, 454 U.S. at 310 (White, J., dissenting); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 809-10 (White,
J., dissenting).
118. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 265 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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understandable obsession with fundraising, and so free him and his staff to
communicate in more places and ways unconnected with the fundraising
function.""..9 In his view, the government could assert "weighty interest in..
• insulat[ing] the political expression of [a] federal candidate from the
influence inevitably exerted by the endless job of raising increasingly large
sums of money.,
120
Third, Justice White was more willing to justify restrictions that have First
Amendment implications in order to allow governments the leeway needed
to construct sensible, comprehensive systems of campaign finance
regulation. Thus, he found expenditure limitations necessary in order to
reinforce contribution limits, and to ensure that workable campaign finance
regulation remained possible. 12 Similarly, Justice White complained about
the Court's distinction between independent and coordinated
expenditures. 122 He had little sympathy for the argument that independent
expenditures were protected by the First Amendment, and was particularly
concerned that independent expenditures could replace campaign
contributions and thus could pose many of the same risks of apparent or
real corruption. 23 In short, Justice White was perhaps the Court's most
consistent voice in favor of effective campaign finance regulation.
GOVERNMENT-FACILITATED SPEECH
During his tenure, Justice White grappled with an issue that has
continued to plague the Court, namely the government's power to control
speech through the commitment of its own money or property. In the early
1980s, the Court struggled with the issue in the context of deciding whether
a school district could remove books from school library shelves, which led
to the Court's fractured split in Board of Education v. Pico.'24 The Court
also struggled to define the free speech rights of government employees.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. In Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., Berkeley, and Buckley, Justice White
observed that it made little sense to limit contributions without also limiting expenditures.
Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 510-11 (White, J., dissenting);
Berkeley, 454 U.S. at 303-04 (White, J., dissenting); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 265 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, in White's view, the First Amendment could
not completely preclude some control of the level of expenditures.
122. Nat'l Conservative PoliticalAction Comm., 470 U.S. at 511-12 (White, J., dissenting).
123. Id.
124. 457 U.S. 853 (1982). Indeed, Justice White's inability to join either Justice Brennan's
plurality opinion or Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion precluded the Court from
establishing a standard to be applied in such cases. SeegenerallyHUTCHINSON, supra note 75,
at 390-94.
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Justice White's opinion in Connick v. Myers 25 resolved one of several cases
in which the Court addressed that issue. The need to confront the
constitutional implications of government-facilitated speech has arisen
more often in the context of constitutional challenges to government
restriction on the use of government-owned real property for speech
purposes.1 6 Justice White revised the approach for resolving such cases in
his opinion for the Court in Perry Educational Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators Ass'n.127  The Court has used the Perry framework more
generally in analyzing the constitutionality of government restrictions on
government-facilitated speech.
28
Prior to Perry, the Court divided government-owned property into two
categories, public fora and non-public fora, for purposes of constitutional
analysis. In public fora, like streets and parks, the government could not
regulate the content of speech, including the subjects to be broached. The
government could enforce only "time, place, and manner"'3 restrictions.'
In effect, then, for speech purposes the government had to treat public fora
as if it did not own them.3 2 In non-public fora, like military bases, the
government could prohibit speech, so long as it did so on a content neutral
basis. 33
In Perry, Justice White, faced with a case involving the inter-office mail
system of a public school, added to the conventional dual categorization a
third type of forum, the limited public forum. 34  In such fora the
125. 461 U.S. 138,140-42 (1983). Employee speech cases involve government regulation
as an employer regulating the responsibilities of employees in ways purportedly related to
their jobs, as opposed to government regulating speech as a regulator, that is, controlling
people's use of their own resources.
126. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1.983); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828
(1976); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
127. 460 U.S. 37, 44-54 (1983).
128. See Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390-91, 393 (1993); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173, 200 (1991); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988); Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Def. & Ed. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 801-02 (1985); Grace, 461 U.S. at 177.
129. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-24 at 986-88 (2d ed.
1988). See generally Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum:Cox v. Louisiana,
1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1. The Court's departure from its traditional two-category conception of
public "spaces" was perhaps presaged by Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298
(1974) (upholding the city's refusal to allow political advertising on its transit vehicles because
advertising space on a city's transit system does not constitute a First Amendment forum).
130. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
131. Bernard W. Bell, Filth, Filtering, and the First Amendment: Ruminations on Public
Libraries' Use of Internet Filtering Software, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 191,201 (2001).
132. Id. at 200-01.
133. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838-39 (1976).
134. Perry, 460 U.S. at 41, 44-47, 55.
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government could limit speakers pursuant to a governmental purpose.135
The creation of this third category allowed the government to create fora
for communications that would serve specific government purposes.
Because such fora were used for communication, they could not be
considered non-public fora. They also could not be considered public fora
because precluding all government control of speech would frustrate the
government's ability to ensure that the forum remained dedicated to the
government's chosen purposes. 3 6  However, the Court subsequently
expanded the concept of the limited public forum,3 7 and the concept lies at
the heart of many legal controversies.138 The Court has not yet fully come to
grips with the problem of government-facilitated speech.
Justice White surely did not resolve the conundrum presented by
government facilitation of speech. However, his decision in Perry still
stands as an important milestone in the Court's efforts to grapple with the
issue. At the very least, Perrypointed the way toward a full appreciation of
the problem and provided a first step toward addressing the conundrum
pragmatically.
CONCLUSION
Justice White was a guardian of free speech, but a cautious, pragmatic
one. As the Justice suggested in Florida Star v. B.J.F, 9 he would not allow
the Free Speech Clause to protect behavior that transgressed certain basic,
generally-recognized standards of decent conduct. 4 Thus, journalists could
not rely on the Free Speech Clause to excuse their failure to keep
promises,4 their intrusions into sexual assault victims' privacy, 42 their
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refusal to cooperate with legitimate law enforcement investigations, their
publication of erroneous information that damaged individuals'
reputations,'" or their non-consensual use of intellectual property in ways
that threatened to deprive performers of their livelihood. 145 The same
pragmatism led Justice White to give government more leeway in
controlling speech on government premises than in regulating the speech of
private citizens using private resources. That flexibility also allowed him to
recognize a different type of speaker, namely the "public trustee," and thus
uphold content-based regulation of broadcasters against a Free Speech
Clause attack in RedLion. Pragmatism and flexibility are hallmarks of his
separate opinions berating the Court for striking down various campaign
finance regulations. Ultimately, when the history of the Free Speech Clause
is written in the latter half of the Twentieth Century, Justice White's
contributions will find a prominent place.
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